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THE PARTY’S OVER: THE ROLE OF EARNINGS GUIDANCE IN RESOLVING
SENTIMENT-DRIVEN OVERVALUATION

1. Introduction
Prior research in finance indicates that firms with high valuation uncertainty and/or
arbitrage constraints are subject to overvaluation during periods of high investor sentiment.
Specifically, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) show that younger firms, firms with lower market
capitalization, higher return volatility, negative earnings, higher intangible assets, and lower
dividends have lower returns in the months following high sentiment periods.1 Subsequent studies
investigate the effects of investor sentiment on various market participants and find that sentiment
affects managers’ real investment decisions and analyst earnings optimism (Polk and Sapienza
(2009), Hribar and McInnis (2011)). This research also finds that sentiment can predict various
stock market anomalies and is more likely to persist in stocks held predominantly by noise traders
(Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Livnat and Petrovits (2009)). However, while most of these
studies provide evidence consistent with stock overvaluation driven by either limits of arbitrage or
investor irrationality, none of them demonstrate the process through which the market corrects the
prior overvaluation. In this study, we examine whether earnings expectations play a role in
sentiment-driven overvaluation by focusing on market reactions to management earnings guidance.
Our results indicate that a great deal of the previously documented overvaluation resolves around
management earnings guidance, which suggests that earnings expectations are indeed a culprit in
sentiment-driven overvaluation.
Understanding the underlying process linking investor sentiment to overvaluation provides
insight into investor psychology and difficult-to-predict bull and bear markets. Currently, there are
multiple possible explanations for why uncertain stocks are overvalued during high sentiment
periods. For example, investors may exhibit different preferences, such as reduced risk aversion,
during high sentiment periods, which would lead them to overpay for stocks with high valuation
uncertainty. Under this scenario, in subsequent months, a general shift in investing trends or
psychology would lead to the gradual decline in prices. Alternatively, investors may engage in a
more detailed thought process that involves unrealistic expectations of future firm earnings, where
there is more potential to overestimate future earnings for uncertain firms. Under this scenario, in
1

Throughout the paper, we refer to firms that exhibit these seven characteristics as “uncertain” or “difficult to
value”, and we use these terms interchangeably.
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subsequent months, revisions in earnings guidance or other earnings news released by the
overvalued firms should lead to predictable price declines. We focus on the second explanation,
examining management earnings guidance to test the extent to which the correction of earnings
expectations mitigates the overvaluation problem.
In theory, if sentiment reflects investors’ irrational expectations about future earnings, then
firm-specific earnings information should correct for investors’ expectation errors and reduce
overvaluation. Consistent with this conjecture, growth stocks and stocks subject to high differences
of opinion tend to earn significantly lower returns around earnings announcements (La Porta et al.
(1997), Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and Tice (2009)). However, prior investor sentiment
research (Baker and Wurgler (2006)) finds only weak evidence that the average earnings
announcement return is inversely related to sentiment for the subset of firms that are overvalued
(undervalued) when sentiment is high (low). In addition, there is no evidence that earnings
announcement effects are any greater than would be expected during a randomly chosen three-day
window. We focus on returns around earnings guidance windows because these are important
events which provide information to investors about firms’ expected performance, prior to the
actual earnings announcement. It is well established that guidance events influence both stock
prices and analysts’ opinions (Matsumoto (2002), Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner (2007), Choi, Myers,
Zang, and Ziebart (2010)). Moreover, several recent accounting studies find that guidance events
are more important than earnings announcements in conveying information to equity markets (Ball
and Shivakumar (2008), Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010)).
We use the First Call Company Issued Guidelines database to delve deeper into the process
through which sentiment-driven overvaluation is resolved. Whereas previous studies (Baker and
Wurgler (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Hribar and McInnis
(2011)) examine the returns over the subsequent month or quarter depending upon prior investor
sentiment, we examine the pattern of returns within those subsequent months. Specifically, we test
whether the lower subsequent returns are concentrated around earnings guidance issued by
managers of overvalued firms. Like previous studies of sentiment, we find that small firms and
young firms, as well as those with high return volatility, high intangible assets, and low dividend
payments, have lower monthly returns when prior investor sentiment is high. However, these
returns are mostly contained within the three-day window around the issuance of management
earnings forecasts. Roughly three-fourths of the predictable negative returns occur in this three day
window, while the remaining fourth occurs over the other eighteen trading days in the month.
Additionally, returns over entire months during which guidance was not issued are roughly half the
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magnitude of three-day guidance window returns, again suggesting that guidance plays a strong
role in price correction. We also find that the market is more sensitive to earnings surprises
(particularly negative surprises) following high sentiment periods. However, results from
additional tests suggest that managers’ attempts to preempt the earnings announcement are not
always successful, as we still find some evidence that returns around the three-day earnings
announcement window are significantly negative for small and loss firms, and firms with higher
volatility following high sentiment periods. Moreover, consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006),
we do not find any systematic evidence that sentiment-driven overvaluation resolves around the
three-day earnings announcement window for firms that did not issue guidance. This pattern of
results suggests that managers may intentionally issue guidance in an attempt to preempt negative
earnings surprises, which could explain why sentiment-driven overvaluation does not resolve
around earnings announcements. Consistent with prior work showing that transient institutional
ownership induces earnings-related myopia (Bushee (1998)), we find that firms with higher
transient ownership are less likely to guide (and their guidance is less likely to contain a negative
surprise) following high sentiment periods.
Taken together, our results suggest that earnings expectations play a strong role in
sentiment-driven overvaluation. In addition, investors do not appear to ignore bad news when
firms are overvalued, but rather exhibit a stronger reaction to bad news forecasts following high
sentiment periods. Our findings are important for understanding the nature of investor sentiment
and earnings expectations, as well as the effects of management earnings guidance on the market.
While prior research on investor sentiment investigates how various agents (managers, investors
and analysts) are affected by investor sentiment, none examines the factors that resolve sentimentdriven overvaluation. Our results indicate that investor sentiment does not lead to overvaluation
through general beliefs or preferences such as shifts in risk aversion, but rather through firmspecific earnings expectations, a finding which may be relevant to the formulation of hypotheses
and research designs in future studies of investor sentiment and market bubbles. Our paper also
expands upon prior research investigating the interplay of accounting information and investor
sentiment (Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), Brown et al. (2009), Hribar and McInnis (2011)).
Whereas these studies conclude that investor sentiment leads managers (analysts) to intentionally
(unintentionally) bias their disclosures and forecasts, our study suggests that management
earnings guidance plays a significant role in correcting optimistic market expectations, and thus
that firm-specific disclosures also have beneficial effects. Finally, Berkman et al. (2009) find that
earnings announcements reduce overvaluation in stocks subject to high short sale constraints and
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high differences of opinion, or in other words in stocks for which valuation difficulty is identifiably
high. Our findings suggest that earnings guidance events play an important role in mitigating
overvaluation driven by a different source (investor sentiment), suggesting that earnings
expectations likely play a broad role in overvaluation and that the disclosure of earnings-related
information plays a broad role in mitigating this problem.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses our data sources and
key variables. Section III presents our research design and descriptive statistics. Section IV
discusses our univariate and regression results, and Section V concludes.

2. Data Sources and Key Variable Definitions
2.1 Sentiment and Characteristics Indicating Overvaluation
We utilize the monthly sentiment index constructed by the Michigan Consumer Research
Center (MCRC). This measure is based on opinion surveys administered to households, and gauges
their perceptions of financial well-being, consumer spending, and the strength of the economy.
These measures are rated on a scale from 1 to 5, and are then combined by the MCRC to arrive at an
overall monthly measure of sentiment. Prior work supports the use of this measure as a proxy of
investor sentiment, as it is highly correlated with actual investor optimism (Qiu and Welch (2006),
Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008)).2 We conduct cross-sectional tests in low and high sentiment
periods using the seven firm characteristics identified by Baker and Wurgler (2006) as being
linearly related to firm returns (size, return volatility, earnings, R&D, PP&E, dividends and age). As
discussed in Section I, these characteristics proxy for valuation uncertainty and/or arbitrage
constraints and hence predict sentiment-driven valuation differences.

2.2 Earnings Guidance
We use management forecasts of future earnings available from the First Call Company
Issued Guidelines (CIG) database beginning in January of 1996 (the first year used in the typical
earnings guidance study due to the relative incompleteness of the data in years prior) and ending in
December of 2006. We include both quarterly and annual earnings guidance. Because we have a
monthly measure of investor sentiment, we match all forecasts made in month t to the investor
2

An alternative measure of sentiment introduced by Baker and Wurgler (2007) orthogonalizes macroeconomic
factors. While six of the seven firm characteristics load significantly in the predicted direction using the MCRC
monthly measure of sentiment, we find in untabulated tests that firm size becomes barely insignificant (p = 0.11)
using the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly measure of sentiment (which is available only through 2005). The
remaining five characteristics load significantly in the predicted direction using the Baker and Wurgler measure.
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sentiment measure at t – 1. The database also identifies whether each forecast represents a positive,
negative or zero surprise compared to the consensus analyst forecast. We use this variable for our
surprise tests.3 We also require data to be available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT in order to calculate
the guidance window returns, firm size, the book-to-market ratio, and six months prior cumulative
returns, as well as the Baker and Wurgler firm characteristics which include (besides size), return
volatility, earnings, R&D expenditure, PP&E, dividends and age. Moreover, we exclude observations
where an earnings announcement is issued within the three-day guidance window to make sure
that our results are not driven by market reactions to earnings surprises.4 These data requirements
result in a final sample size of 31,360 management forecasts, which are issued by a total of 3,883
firms.

3. Research Design and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Design
We examine the relation between investor sentiment and guidance window returns using
the following model specification:
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The dependent variable, Car(-1, +1), is the raw return minus the CRSP value-weighted index
cumulative over a three-day window around the issuance of the earnings guidance.5 Size is the log
market value of equity at the end of the prior month. BTM is the firm’s book value of equity scaled
by the market value of equity at the end of the prior month. Momentum is the firm’s marketadjusted cumulative return during the prior six months. Sentiment is the decile-ranked MCRC
sentiment index, and the key effect of interest is the interaction term, Sentiment × Characteristic,
where Characteristic is one of the seven signals taken from Baker and Wurgler (2006). These
characteristics take the form of binary variables for three reasons. First, three of the signals are
3

We include both quantitative and qualitative forecasts in our sample. Qualitative forecasts are forecasts where a
company does not provide a specific numerical estimate of earnings. First Call classifies them as zero surprise
forecasts unless management indicates that prior expectations are too high or too low. We include them because they
are still likely to convey important information to market participants.
4
In untabulated tests, we find that our results are robust to including guidance events where an earnings
announcement was issued within the three-day guidance window.
5
Returns and control variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to avoid the influence of outliers. Our
results are qualitatively identical when we do not winsorize.
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naturally binary (dividends vs. no dividends, positive vs. negative earnings, and R&D vs. no R&D
because many firms have no R&D expenditure). Second, binary splits make it easy to compare the
magnitude of monthly returns and guidance window returns across characteristics in our tables
and figures. Third, the four remaining signals exhibit some correlation with sentiment itself, making
interactions difficult to interpret. We rank these remaining characteristics (size, return volatility,
PP&E, and age) by month to eliminate this correlation. The firm characteristics are defined as
follows: Size is equal to one if the firm is above the median market value of equity at the end of the
prior month, and zero otherwise. Volatility is equal to one if the firm is above the median in monthly
return volatility over the prior six months, and zero otherwise. Loss is equal to one if the firm
experienced negative earnings in the most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. R&D is equal to
one if the firm had an R&D expenditure in the most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. PP&E is
equal to one if the firm is above the median plant, property and equipment scaled by total assets in
the most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Dividends is equal to one if the firm paid dividends
in the most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Age is equal to one if the firm is above the median
age in years (measured as the time since the firm first appeared on CRSP), and zero otherwise. All
of our regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by month.6

3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. The mean market-adjusted guidance window
return is -2.8%, suggesting that earnings guidance lowers market expectations on average during
the 1996-2006 sample period. The mean market-adjusted monthly return for the same period is 2.7%. The mean book-to-market is 0.553 and the mean market-adjusted cumulative six month
return (momentum) is 1.8%. As for the Baker and Wurgler (2006) characteristics, the mean return
volatility over the prior six months is 0.124 and the mean of the binary loss variable is 0.175. All of
these means are generally consistent with prior studies using a sample of guiding firms (Ajinkya,
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2005), Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008)). The remaining firm
characteristics also seem reasonable. The mean R&D expenditure represents 3.2% of total assets,
the mean plant, property and equipment represents 44% of total assets, approximately 42% of the
firms pay dividends, and the mean firm age is 18 years. Also consistent with prior research,
management earnings guidance is more likely to take the form of a negative surprise (Bergman and
6

Our results are unaffected by any of the following: 1. ranking Size, Volatility, PP&E, and Age into deciles, 2. factor
analyzing all seven signals and using the first orthogonal factor to represent firm uncertainty, or 3. combining
signals linearly into one composite measure using their decile ranks.
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Roychowdhury (2008)). Negative surprises occur around 31% of the time while positive surprises
occur around 12% of the time.7

[Insert Table 1]

Table 2 presents correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent variables.
As previously mentioned, some of the firm characteristics are weakly correlated with investor
sentiment. Ranking Size, Volatility, PP&E, and Age by month alleviates this issue. Interestingly,
investor sentiment is also correlated with the surprise variables – high sentiment months are less
likely to be followed by positive surprises and more likely to be followed by negative surprises.

[Insert Table 2]

4. Results
4.1 The Effect of Sentiment on Guidance Window Returns Controlling for Characteristics
We first examine whether investor sentiment and firm characteristics predict guidance
window returns after controlling for size, book-to-market and momentum. As previously discussed,
we use three-day cumulative market-adjusted returns centered on management guidance issuance
dates. Results are displayed in Table 3 for all seven characteristics. For brevity, the coefficients for
size, book-to-market, and momentum are not reported. The key effects of interest are the Sentiment
× Characteristic interactions. To be consistent with prior research and theory, the expected
interaction coefficients are positive for size, PP&E, dividends and age, and negative for volatility,
losses and R&D. For six of seven regressions, the interaction coefficient is significant in the expected
direction (the effect of loss is not significant). Because Sentiment is decile ranked and each
characteristic is binary, the coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of a one decile increase in
investor sentiment on the three-day window return difference between low- and high-uncertainty
firms. The effect of moving from the bottom to the top sentiment decile ranges in magnitude from
roughly 1.8% for firm size to 4.14% for return volatility, with other characteristics falling in
between. Interestingly, the coefficient on Sentiment is also negative and significant in each
regression, suggesting that market reactions are generally more negative to earnings guidance
7

The remaining sample consists of forecasts that First Call identify as guidance issuances that do not qualify as a
surprise, either because the firm forecast is equal to the prior analyst consensus, the range forecast contains the prior
analyst consensus, there was no current analyst forecast to compare the firm forecast to, or the forecast was a
qualitative forecast indicating that management was “okay with expectations.”
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following high sentiment periods. These results suggest that earnings expectations play a role in
sentiment-driven overvaluation.

[Insert Table 3]

4.2 Comparing Guidance Window Returns to Total Monthly Returns
To test the relative importance of earnings guidance in the months subsequent to high
sentiment periods, we run the same regressions with returns outside of the guidance window (the
remaining eighteen trading days in the month) on the left hand side and compare the interaction
coefficients to the coefficients for the three-day guidance window returns. Table 4 displays the
effect of a one-decile increase in lagged sentiment on three-day guidance window (first column)
and returns over the remaining eighteen trading days (second column) for each of the seven
characteristics. Again, based upon the results of prior sentiment research (Baker and Wurgler
(2006)), we expect guidance window returns to be more negative following high sentiment
(compared to low sentiment) periods for these characteristic differences: small – big, high
volatility – low volatility, loss – profit, R&D – no R&D, low PP&E – high PP&E, dividend nonpayer –
dividend payer, and young – old. While the effect of a one-decile increase in lagged sentiment is
associated with a three-day guidance window return of -0.30%, the effect on the remaining
eighteen trading days is merely -0.08%. We also compare the monthly short-long hedge portfolio
returns for months without guidance issuance. The third column displays the returns for months in
which no earnings guidance is issued by the same 3,883 firms over the 1996-2006 sample period.
The average effect of a one-decile increase in lagged sentiment is -0.16%, just over half the
magnitude of the three-day guidance window effect, which reinforces the importance of guidance
events in resolving sentiment-driven overvaluation.

[Insert Table 4]

The plots in Figure 1 present the market-adjusted return patterns more tellingly. The 21day return window around guidance issuance is plotted for low- and high-uncertainty firms and for
low- (below the median) and high- (above the median) lagged sentiment. As can be seen, the
strongest negative guidance window return is uniformly concentrated in firms with higher
uncertainty following high sentiment periods. While there does appear to be some evidence of very
slightly lower returns for these firms in the first week, the most stark differences are concentrated
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in the three-day guidance window. Following the guidance window, there is no clear difference in
returns among the four groups. These results provide additional evidence that earnings
expectations are a major link between investor sentiment and firm overvaluation. Once earnings
guidance is released, the market appears to revert to more accurate firm valuations.

[Insert Figure 1]

4.3 The Effect of Sentiment on Earnings Announcement Window Returns Controlling for
Characteristics
Thus far, our results are consistent with earnings expectations playing a role in sentimentdriven overvaluation, and provide a plausible alternative explanation for why Baker and Wurgler
(2006) only find weak evidence of overvaluation resolving around earnings announcement
windows. If information that would otherwise be released via an earnings announcement is already
communicated through the management forecast, then this suggests that there should not be a
negative market reaction around earnings announcement windows for high uncertainty firms
following high sentiment periods. Therefore, we examine returns around earnings announcement
windows for both preempted and non-preempted earnings announcements in this section. We
define (non)preempted earnings announcements as those (not) preceded by at least one
management forecast prior to the three-day earnings announcement window. We replace the
dependent variable in model (1) with EACAR(-1, +1) where EACAR(-1, +1) is the cumulative marketadjusted three-day return centered around the earnings announcement date. The results for this
analysis are presented in Table 5. For brevity, we only present coefficients on the interaction terms.
The first row of Table 5 presents results for the sample of firms where the earnings
announcement was preceded by at least one management forecast. Consistent with earnings
guidance moving information forward that would otherwise be released at the earnings
announcement, the returns are no longer significant for R&D, PP&E, Dividends, and Age. However,
the results also suggest that small, high volatility, and loss firms earn significantly lower returns
around earnings announcement windows. The second row of Table 5 presents results for the nonpreempted sample. While the coefficients are all in the expected direction, we do not find robust
evidence that returns are significantly negative around earnings announcement windows for the
seven firm characteristics. This may be because managers intentionally attempt to preempt bad
earnings announcement news, such that the absence of earnings guidance is evidence of the
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absence of unrevealed bad news.8 Taken together, these results suggest that while earnings
guidance plays a role in resolving sentiment-driven overvaluation, managers are not always
successful in preempting the negative reaction at the earnings announcement.

[Insert Table 5]

4.4 The Effect of Sentiment on Market Reactions to Positive and Negative Guidance Surprises
The negative market reaction to guidance from high uncertainty firms following high
sentiment periods suggests that market reactions to negative surprises may be stronger following
high sentiment periods. To test this possibility, we use the following model:
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PosSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the earnings guidance represents a positive
surprise (higher than the prior analyst consensus forecast, as defined on First Call), and zero
otherwise. NegSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the earnings guidance represents a negative
surprise (lower than the prior analyst consensus forecast, as defined on First Call), and zero
otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. All models use robust standard errors
clustered by month. The key effects of interest are the sentiment by surprise interactions. If the
market exhibits increased sensitivity to earnings guidance, the positive surprise interaction should
be significantly positive, while the negative surprise interaction should be significantly negative.
Table 6 displays results for model (2). Positive surprises garner a stronger reaction
following high sentiment periods as evidenced by the interaction coefficient, which indicates that
each decile increase in sentiment leads to a 0.28% higher three-day return for positive surprises.
Similarly, negative surprises also garner a stronger reaction following high sentiment periods
which appears to be even stronger than the effect on positive surprises. The coefficient on the
interaction term indicates that each decile increase in sentiment leads to a 0.64% lower three-day
return for negative surprises. These results suggest that increases in investor sentiment will
predominantly lead to stronger negative market reactions to earnings guidance. This result is

8

We examine management incentives to preempt bad news in high sentiment periods in section 4.5.
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consistent with market earnings expectations being higher during high sentiment periods, and with
negative surprises correcting the overvaluation that these expectations create.9

[Insert Table 6]

4.5 The Effect of Investor Myopia on Guidance Decisions
The prior section documents a statistically significant association between sentiment and
market reactions to bad news earnings guidance. In this section, we examine whether managers
have incentives to withhold bad news during high sentiment periods. Prior research suggests that
there is a strong link between firms’ disclosure practices and their composition of institutional
ownership (Bushee and Noe (2000)). For example, transient institutional investors who have
shorter investment horizons invest more heavily in firms with more frequent disclosures because
forthcoming disclosure practices reduce information asymmetry and lessen the price impact on
trades. On the other hand, if management is aware that transient investors will immediately reduce
their holdings when bad news is issued, then this may lead management to suppress bad news
when earnings expectations are higher during high sentiment periods. Consistent with this idea,
Bushee (1998) shows that higher transient ownership induces managers to make myopic decisions
in order to present more positive earnings news. To test whether investor myopia affects
management guidance decisions, we utilize the following model:
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Disclose is a binary variable equal to one if the firm issued at least one management forecast
prior to the actual earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. Transient is a binary variable equal
to one if the level of transient institutional investor holdings is above the median, and zero
otherwise. We identify transient institutional investors using the Bushee (1998) classification
method and measure institutional holdings at the quarterly level. The first column of Table 7

9

In untabulated analyses, we also test whether guidance is more likely to represent a negative surprise for
overvalued firms following high sentiment periods, which would also explain the strong effect of guidance reactions
in resolving sentiment-driven overvaluation. Consistent with our expectations, we find that size and PP&E are
negatively correlated with the issuance of a negative surprise while volatility and R&D are positively correlated with
a negative surprise. Similarly, volatility, loss and R&D are negatively correlated with a positive surprise, while
PP&E, age and dividends are positively correlated with a positive surprise.
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presents the regression results for model (3). The coefficient on Sentiment is negative and
significant 



= -0.0714, p < 0.01), consistent with Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008). Consistent

with Bushee and Noe (2000), we also find a positive association between high transient
institutional ownership and the likelihood of disclosure (



coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative (

= 0.480, p < 0.01). Moreover, the
"

= -0.0301, p < 0.01), which suggests

that firms with high transient institutional ownership are less likely to disclose when sentiment is
high.
To provide further evidence that management has incentives to suppress bad news when
earnings expectations are high, we examine the effect of sentiment and investor myopia on the
likelihood of good and bad news disclosures, and estimate a variation of model (3) with NegSurp
and PosSurp on the left hand side. The results for this analysis are provided in the last two columns
of Table 7. The negative coefficient (

"

= -0.0271, p < 0.05) on the interaction terms suggest that

high transient institutional ownership firms are less likely to issue guidance that is below prevailing
analysts’ consensus in high sentiment periods. However, we do not find that they are more likely to
issue good news when sentiment is high. Overall, these findings are consistent with investor
myopia and optimistic market expectations influencing managers’ disclosure behavior. Firms with
greater transient institutional holdings are less likely to provide (bad news) guidance to dampen
earnings expectations when investor sentiment is high.

[Insert Table 7]

5. Conclusion
Our results indicate that market reactions to management guidance are more negative for
firms facing high uncertainty and/or arbitrage constraints following high sentiment periods. The
three-day guidance window returns represent the majority of monthly negative returns. We also
find some evidence that earnings guidance moves forward information that would otherwise be
released at the earnings announcement, but does not always fully preempt negative earnings
announcement news. In addition, the market reacts more strongly to negative surprises contained
in earnings guidance following high sentiment periods, and managers are hesitant to correct
market expectations when they have a myopic investor base. Taken together, these results suggest
that optimistic earnings expectations play a strong role in sentiment-driven overvaluation and that
earnings guidance plays an important role in mitigating this effect.
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This study contributes to several streams of research. First, our results shed light on the
market psychology behind sentiment-driven overvaluation, which should be relevant for future
studies of investor sentiment and investor behavior more generally. We also contribute to the
management guidance literature by showing that earnings guidance can correct market
expectations at critical times. Our results contrast with those of prior accounting research, which
suggests that managers withhold their private information to exacerbate rather than attenuate
overvaluation (Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008)), which should provide a more balanced
picture to researchers in this area. Together, our results suggest that while managers may reduce
their disclosure frequency during high sentiment periods, the disclosures actually help make prices
more efficient by reducing overvaluation and resolving uncertainty.
An important caveat to our findings and interpretation is that while prior finance research
suggests that negative returns following high sentiment periods represent overvaluation, our
findings do not necessarily imply market inefficiency beyond limits to arbitrage. As previously
discussed, many of the valuation uncertainty variables are also posited to proxy for short-sale
constraints (e.g., small firms with high intangibles and poor earnings), which would make arbitrage
difficult during high sentiment periods.
The results point toward a variety of directions for future research. Future studies could
attempt to delve deeper into managers’ incentives to determine when guidance most contributes to
resolving overvaluation, investigating the effects of stock option compensation, litigation risk, or
information asymmetry. Research could also test whether firms who issue guidance during these
critical periods benefit from increased future disclosure credibility in the eyes of investors. It would
also be interesting to examine returns around other events that may influence earnings
expectations, such as articles in the financial press or negative analyst forecast revisions. All of
these issues may be fruitful topics for future research.
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These graphs present the pattern of returns around guidance issuance dates by high/low sentiment periods and firm characteristics for the 21-day
guidance window. The plotted values represent, on each trading day relative to the guidance issuance date (event date 0), the firm’s marketadjusted returns. Firms are split into two groups based on the median of firm size, return volatility, PP&E/A, and age, and whether the firm had
R&D expenses, losses, and dividends in the most recent fiscal year. High (Low) Sent are months in which the sentiment index is above (below) the
median. Each panel includes all 31,360 guidance event observations.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Car(-1, +1)
MonthRet
Size
BTM
Momentum
Sentiment
Volatility
Loss
R&D/A
PP&E/A
Dividends
Age
PosSurp
NegSurp

N
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360
31,360

Mean
-0.028
-0.027
13.682
0.553
0.018
94.673
0.124
0.175
0.032
0.441
0.418
18.096
0.117
0.305

Q1
-0.073
-0.114
12.404
0.247
-0.197
88.800
0.066
0.000
0.000
0.171
0.000
5.000
0.000
0.000

Median
-0.010
-0.017
13.562
0.422
-0.014
93.700
0.100
0.000
0.000
0.375
0.000
11.000
0.000
0.000

Q3
0.032
0.063
14.877
0.687
0.171
102.700
0.155
0.000
0.036
0.634
1.000
26.000
0.000
1.000

Std. Dev
0.132
0.200
1.858
0.511
0.369
8.564
0.111
0.380
0.068
0.344
0.493
18.677
0.322
0.461

This table presents summary statistics for our dependent and independent variables. CAR(-1, +1) is the
cumulative market-adjusted 3 day return centered around the earnings guidance issuance date. MonthRet
is market-adjusted monthly return. Size is the log market value of equity at the end of the prior month.
BTM is the firm’s book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity at the end of the prior month.
Momentum is the firm’s cumulative marketed-adjusted return during the prior six months. Sentiment is the
monthly MCRC sentiment index measure. Volatility is monthly return volatility over the prior six months.
Loss is a binary variable equal to one if the firm experienced negative earnings in the most recent fiscal
year, and zero otherwise. R&D/A is the firm’s R&D expense scaled by total assets during the most recent
fiscal year. PP&E/A is the firm’s plant, property, and equipment scaled by total assets during the most
recent fiscal year. Dividends is a binary variable equal to one if the firm paid dividends during the most
recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Age is firm age. PosSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the
earnings guidance is higher than the prior analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise. NegSurp is a
binary variable equal to one if the earnings guidance is lower than the prior analyst consensus forecast,
and zero otherwise.
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1
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This table displays correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent variables (Spearman along lower diagonal and Pearson along upper
diagonal). CAR(-1, +1) is the cumulative market-adjusted 3 day return centered around the earnings guidance issuance date. MonthRet is marketadjusted monthly return. Size is the log market value of equity at the end of the prior month. BTM is the firm’s book value of equity scaled by the
market value of equity at the end of the prior month. Momentum is the firm’s cumulative market-adjusted return during the prior six months.
Sentiment is the decile-ranked MCRC sentiment index. Volatility is monthly return volatility over the prior six months. Loss is a binary variable
equal to one if the firm experienced negative earnings in the most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. R&D/A is the firm’s R&D expense scaled
by total assets during the most recent fiscal year. PP&E/A is the firm’s plant, property, and equipment scaled by total assets during the most recent
fiscal year. Dividends is a binary variable equal to one if the firm paid dividends during the most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Age is firm
age. PosSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the earnings guidance is higher than the prior analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise.
NegSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the earnings guidance is lower than the prior analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise.
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Table 3
The Effect of Sentiment on Guidance Window Returns
Dependent Variable: CAR(-1, +1)
Size

Volatility

Earnings

R&D

PP&E

Dividends

Age

Sentiment

-0.0056***

-0.0023***

-0.0044***

-0.0036***

-0.0062***

-0.0063***

-0.0064***

(0.0009)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0008)

(0.0009)

(0.0009)

(0.0009)

Sent*Size

0.0020***
(0.0006)

Volatility

0.0043
(0.0035)

Sent*Volatility

-0.0046***
(0.0008)

Loss

0.0060
(0.0047)

Sent*Loss

-0.0011
(0.0011)

R&D

-0.0021
(0.0041)

Sent*R&D

-0.0022**
(0.0009)

PP&E

0.0023
(0.0037)

Sent*PP&E

0.0033***
(0.0008)

Dividends

-0.0013
(0.0034)

Sent*Dividends

0.0038***
(0.0007)

Age

-0.0005
(0.0034)

Sent*Age

0.0035***
(0.0007)

Observations

31,360

31,360

31,360

31,360

31,360

31,360

31,360

R-squared

0.038

0.043

0.038

0.040

0.042

0.042

0.041

These regressions test the effects of firm overvaluation in periods of low and high sentiment on guidance
window returns after controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum. CAR(-1, +1) is the marketadjusted 3 day return centered around the earnings guidance issuance date. Sentiment is the decile-ranked
MCRC sentiment index in the prior month. See Table 2 for variable definitions. When interacted with
Sentiment, Size, Volatility, PP&E, and Age are coded as one if above the median, and zero otherwise, while
Loss, R&D, and Dividends are coded as a one when present and zero when absent. Robust standard errors
clustered by month are displayed in parentheses. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p
< .10, .05, or .01, respectively.
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Table 4
Comparing the Effect of Sentiment on Guidance and Non-Guidance Returns

Characteristic
Size (small – big)
Volatility (high – low)
Earnings (loss – profit)
R&D (expense – no expense)
PP&E (low – high)
Dividends (nonpayer – payer)
Age (young – old)

Effect of Decile-Ranked Sentiment
Three-Day
Remaining Eighteen Days
Non-Guidance
Guidance Window
of Guidance Month
Month
-0.20%
-0.03%
-0.21%
-0.46%
-0.23%
-0.20%
-0.11%
0.10%
-0.26%
-0.22%
-0.05%
-0.02%
-0.33%
-0.12%
-0.09%
-0.43%
-0.10%
-0.17%
-0.35%
-0.15%
-0.15%

Average Effect of
Sentiment on Hedge

-0.30%

-0.08%

-0.16%

N

31,360

31,360

268,504

This table presents the effect of lagged monthly sentiment and firm characteristics on market-adjusted
returns, controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum. See Table 2 for variable definitions. All
firm characteristics are binary variables as previously described. The first column displays the effect of a
one-decile increase in lagged sentiment on guidance window returns. The second column displays the
effect of a one-decile increase in lagged sentiment on returns during the eighteen trading days outside of
the guidance window. The third column displays the effect of a one-decile increase in lagged sentiment
on monthly returns for months in which guidance is not issued (all months during the 1996-2006 sample
period for the same firms during which no management guidance was issued).
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Table 5
The Effect of Sentiment on Earnings Announcement Window Returns
Dependent Variable: EACAR(-1, +1)
Size

Volatility

Earnings

R&D

PP&E

Dividends

Age

0.0007**

-0.0011**

-0.0026***

-0.0004

-0.0004

0.0004

0.0001

(0.0003)

(0.0005)

(0.0007)

(0.0004)

(0.0005)

(0.0004)

(0.0005)

Preempted
Sample
n=25,577
Sentiment*
Characteristic
Non-Preempted
Sample
n=86,158
Sentiment*
Characteristic

0.0003

-0.0006

-0.0006

-0.0002

0.0002

0.0006*

0.0004

(0.0002)

(0.0004)

(0.0005)

(0.0004)

(0.0003)

(0.0003)

(0.0004)

This table presents regression results that test the effects of firm overvaluation in periods of low and high
sentiment on earnings announcement window returns after controlling for size, book-to market, and
momentum. The Preempted Sample includes a sample of firms that issued guidance prior to the earnings
announcement. The Non-Preempted Sample includes a sample of firms that did not issue guidance prior to
the earnings announcement. Each cell reports the coefficient on sentiment interacted with the firm
characteristic. EACAR(-1, +1) is the market-adjusted 3 day return centered around the earnings
announcement date. Sentiment is the decile-ranked MCRC sentiment index in the prior month. See Table 2
for variable definitions. When interacted with Sentiment, Size, Volatility, PP&E, and Age are coded as one if
above the median, and zero otherwise, while Loss, R&D, and Dividends are coded as a one when present and
zero when absent. Robust standard errors clustered by month are displayed in parentheses. Coefficients
marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p < .10, .05, or .01, respectively.
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Table 6
The Effect of Sentiment on Market Reaction to Positive and Negative Guidance Surprises
Dependent Variable: Car(-1,+1)
Sentiment

-0.0022***
(0.0006)
0.0469***
(0.0037)
0.0028***
(0.0010)
-0.0668***
(0.0056)
-0.0064***
(0.0011)

PosSurp
Sent*PosSurp
NegSurp
Sent*NegSurp

Observations
R-squared

31,360
0.182

These regressions test the effects of a positive or negative surprise in periods of low and high sentiment on guidance
window returns after controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum. CAR(-1, +1) is the market-adjusted 3 day
return centered around the earnings guidance issuance date. PosSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the earnings
guidance is higher than the prior analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise. NegSurp is a binary variable equal to
one if the earnings guidance is lower than the prior analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise. Sentiment is the
decile-ranked MCRC sentiment index in the prior month. Robust standard errors clustered by month are displayed in
parentheses. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p < .10, .05, or .01, respectively.
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Table 7
The Effect of Investor Myopia on Guidance Decisions

Size
BTM
Momentum
Sentiment
Transient
Sent*Transient

Observations
R-Squared

Pr(Disclose=1)

Pr(NegSurp=1)

Pr(PosSurp=1)

0.2090***
(0.0106)
-0.1020***
(0.0211)
-0.3730***
(0.0511)
-0.0714***
(0.0138)
0.4800***
(0.0360)
-0.0301***
(0.00663)

-0.1510***
(0.0124)
0.0125
(0.0336)
-1.1580***
(0.0735)
0.0362***
(0.0130)
0.1680**
(0.0722)
-0.0271**
(0.0126)

-0.0595***
(0.0153)
0.0459
(0.0488)
0.9850***
(0.0620)
-0.0378***
(0.0146)
0.1610**
(0.0696)
0.0017
(0.0132)

283,936
0.043

30,842
0.046

30,842
0.028

These logit regressions test the effects of sentiment and transient institutional investor holdings on firms’
guidance decisions after controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum. Disclose is a binary
variable equal to one if the firm issued guidance prior to the earnings announcement. PosSurp is a binary
variable equal to one if the earnings guidance is higher than the prior analyst consensus forecast, and zero
otherwise. NegSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the earnings guidance is lower than the prior
analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise. Sentiment is the decile-ranked MCRC sentiment index in
the prior month. Transient is a binary variable equal to one if the level of transient institutional investor
holdings is above the median, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered by month are
displayed in parentheses. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p < .10, .05, or .01,
respectively.
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